Welcome! My main research interests lie in labor economics and public policy evaluation. More specifically, I focus on how information frictions shape job search behavior and employer hiring decisions, and how they contribute to inefficiencies in the labor market matching process.
I am a PhD candidate in Economics at CREST (ENSAE – Institut Polytechnique de Paris), supervised by B. Crépon and R. Rathelot. In collaboration with the French public employment agency (France Travail), I design and evaluate policy interventions to reduce those inefficiencies.
Work in progress
Providing Job Seekers with Labor Market Information
Misperceptions about wages and labor demand may distort job search, but whether correcting them changes search behavior, and through which channel, remains an open question. In a field experiment with 63,670 French job seekers, we provide personalized information about wages and labor market tightness in their targeted occupation and district. We document wide dispersion in baseline beliefs: only 41% of respondents estimate wages within 10% of the true value. Information provision causally shifts beliefs, though most treated respondents either fully incorporate the signal or ignore it entirely. Treatment increases vacancy inspection by 24%, but instrumental variables estimates reveal no pass-through from belief revision to search behavior, and explicit information about higher-wage outside options does not redirect search across markets. The behavioral response operates through increased attention among already-active searchers rather than through corrected expectations.
The Role of Information about Worker Skills in Hiring Decisions
Labour markets differ widely in candidate availability and quality across occupations. In tight occupations, firms face few qualified applicants per vacancy and may struggle to identify productive candidates, especially when applicants come from distant occupations where skill signals are less clear. In slack occupations, recruiters face many applicants and screening becomes more selective. These differences may shape not only hiring decisions, but also the value of additional information about job seekers' skills. We study these mechanisms using an incentivised resume-rating (IRR) experiment with recruiters. Each recruiter evaluates synthetic CVs tailored to their hiring occupation. We experimentally vary education, work experience (in terms of occupational distance between experience and hiring occupation), skill certificates, as well as gender and ethnicity signals within recruiters. We also randomise the quality of the applicant pool between recruiters. We study the impact of these signals on the way recruiters assess productivity, and on their callback decisions.
Decomposing the Ethnic Job Finding Gap: Evidence from Application and Hiring Decisions
Written amid the debate over France's 2023 immigration law, this essay confronts common claims about immigration with the evidence. Since 2000, France's immigrant population has grown steadily, but more slowly than the European average. Immigration has a negligible effect on public finances and, on average, on the wages and employment of native workers. It can also raise productivity and growth, through complementary skills, by easing labor shortages, and by fostering innovation.
Conferences + talks
2026
INASHI ERC Workshop [CREST and France Travail]
2025
Machine Learning in Economics Summer Institute [Chicago Booth], INASHI ERC Workshop [CREST and France Travail], PhD Workshop [CREST]
TA for X. D'Haultfœuille and E. Lapenta. Introduces students to linear regressions, the notion of causality and predictions. It shows how and under which conditions causal parameters can be identified and estimated from random samples (focus on OLS and 2SLS).
TA for F. Malherbet, O. Loisel and S. Bellue. Presents the main facts studied by macroeconomics and the foundations of contemporary economic analysis (Beveridge curve, Inflation taxes, Exogenous growth models, IS-LM model).